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ABSTRACT
Previous works on the CERT insider threat detection case have
neglected graph and text features despite their relevance to de-
scribe user behavior. Additionally, existing systems heavily rely
on feature engineering and audit data aggregation to detect mali-
cious activities. This is time consuming, requires expert knowledge
and prevents tracing back alerts to precise user actions. To address
these issues we introduce ADSAGE to detect anomalies in audit
log events modeled as graph edges. Our general method is the first
to perform anomaly detection at edge level while supporting both
edge sequences and attributes, which can be numeric, categorical or
even text. We describe how ADSAGE can be used for fine-grained,
event level insider threat detection in different audit logs from the
CERT use case. Remarking that there is no standard benchmark for
the CERT problem, we use a previously proposed evaluation setting
based on realistic recall-based metrics. We evaluate ADSAGE on
authentication, email traffic and web browsing logs from the CERT
insider threat datasets, as well as on real-world authentication
events. ADSAGE is effective to detect anomalies in authentications,
modeled as user to computer interactions, and in email communica-
tions. Simple baselines give surprisingly strong results as well. We
also report performance split by malicious scenarios present in the
CERT datasets: interestingly, several detectors are complementary
and could be combined to improve detection. Overall, our results
show that graph features are informative to characterize malicious
insider activities, and that detection at fine-grained level is possible.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security andprivacy→ Intrusion detection systems; •Com-
putingmethodologies→Anomaly detection;Neural networks.
KEYWORDS
security, machine learning, anomaly detection, intrusion detection,
insider threat, graph, edge
1 INTRODUCTION
A recent whitepaper [7] reveals that 90% of organizations feel vul-
nerable to insider threats, i.e. legitimate users who abuse their
access rights to IT systems to conduct malicious activities such
as data theft, sabotage and misuse. Worse, according to the same
source, 53% of organizations confirmed having been targeted in
the last 12 months. Insider threats are particularly harmful to or-
ganizations as the attacker usually possesses knowledge about his
environment, which could help evade detection and increase attack
impact.
To address this issue and foster research on insider threats, in
2013 the CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) of CMU’s
Software Engineering Institute has released a corpus of synthetic
datasets [13, 35]. In a field where public datasets are extremely
scarce due to confidentiality reasons, this release has triggered
a large amount of academic publications. However important re-
search gaps remain; we focus on three of them.
First, most existing detection systems do not integrate all audit
data sources provided in the CERT datasets. Especially heteroge-
neous features like graph and text are often discarded as they are not
supported by many anomaly detection methods, unlike numeric
and categorical features. This is surprising as works addressing
other insider threat settings suggest that graph and text data can
be quite helpful. For example, graph features can be used to model
communication between members of an organization [9, 27] or ac-
cesses to resources [6, 33], in which anomalous patterns can reveal
malicious insiders. Through sentiment analysis and psychometric
measures, text data can help detecting risk factors such as worker
discontentment [5, 16].
Second, existing insider threat detection systems heavily rely on
data aggregation and feature engineering [3, 12, 36]. Indeed, this
strategy can be effective, nevertheless at the cost of alert traceability.
For instance in [36], users are assigned an anomaly score for all
their daily activities, thus determining specifically which action(s)
lead to an alert is not straightforward.
Third, despite all resources concerning the CERT insider threat
use case being public, unfortunately no standard benchmarkmethod-
ology has emerged. Existing works use different metrics and data
subsets for evaluation, rendering performance comparison difficult.
We address the CERT insider threat use case while tackling these
three issues. Concerning the first – support of graph and text data
– we introduce ADSAGE for anomaly-based intrusion detection
supporting numeric, categorical, but also graph and text attributes.
In particular, we leverage graph features by modeling user events
(equivalent to log lines) as graph edges representing interactions
between entities. For instance, an email being sent corresponds to
an edge from the sender to the receiver. Edges can be augmented
with attributes to provide context, such as the time the email was
sent or its text content. Using a recurrent neural network (RNN),
ADSAGE is able to take into account sequences of events. A feed-
forward neural network (FFNN) is used simultaneously to predict
the validity of events and output anomaly scores accordingly. Given
such attributed graph edges, we show how to use ADSAGE to
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uncover insider threats in the CERT datasets. Note that ADSAGE’s
applicability is not limited to insider threat detection: our method
can be used for anomaly detection in sequences of attributed graph
edges in general. To the best of our knowledge, no existing method
for anomaly detection at edge level supports both edge sequences
and attributed edges.
Regarding the second issue (alert traceability), our method op-
erates at event (i.e. log line) level with a unique data source. This
allows flagging anomalies at a fine-grained level and reduces the
need for feature engineering and data aggregation. However, it is
important to note that direct performance comparison with existing
systems like [36], which leverage multiple audit data sources, is
unfair. This study’s primary goal is rather to determine whether
detection at event level without aggregation is feasible at all. Using
the different malicious insider scenarios in the CERT setting as
our threat model, we empirically determine which data sources are
relevant to detect different threat scenarios.
Concerning the third issue (absence of standard evaluationmethod-
ology), as an effort towards benchmark standardization we adopt
the evaluation setting from [36], chosen for its business-realistic
metrics. We complement our results with an evaluation on real
authentications from the LANL cybersecurity datasets [17, 18].
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We introduce ADSAGE, a general method to detect anom-
alies in sequences of graph edges with numeric, categorical
and text attributes.
• We show how to apply ADSAGE for fine-grained event level
detection in the CERT insider threat use case, enhancing alert
traceability and reducing the need for feature engineering.
• Weempirically evaluate ourmethod on three log data sources
from the CERT datasets (logon, email and web) and on LANL
authentication events. Our experiments suggest that AD-
SAGE is effective for logon and email data. By reporting
detection results for individual threat scenarios, we show
which audit data sources are relevant to detect each scenario.
2 PROBLEM SETTING AND APPROACH
2.1 CERT insider threat use case
The CERT insider threat datasets [13, 35] contain synthetic data rep-
resenting the activity of users within a large organization. Available
audit data sources include logon events, email traffic, web brows-
ing traces, file access logs, usage of removable devices as well as
LDAP information describing the organization hierarchy and user
roles. We focus on events that are straightforwardly represented
as interactions between two entities, i.e. graph edges: logon (user
to computer), email (sender to receivers) and web browsing (user
to web domain) events. In our evaluation, we use version 6.2 of
the CERT dataset, which contains one example of each scenario.
Note that this represents an extremely unbalanced problem with an
anomaly rate in the order of 10−6 at event level or 10−5 at user-day
level (i.e. when aggregating all data sources daily for each user).
Our threat model consists of insider threat scenarios which are
described as follows in the CERT documentation [35]:
(1) User who did not previously use removable drives or work
after hours begins logging in after hours, using a remov-
able drive, and uploading data to wikileaks.org. Leaves the
organization shortly thereafter.
(2) User begins surfing job websites and soliciting employment
from a competitor. Before leaving the company, they use a
thumb drive (at markedly higher rates than their previous
activity) to steal data.
(3) System administrator becomes disgruntled. Downloads a
keylogger and uses a thumb drive to transfer it to his super-
visor’s machine. The next day, he uses the collected keylogs
to log in as his supervisor and send out an alarming mass
email, causing panic in the organization. He leaves the orga-
nization immediately.
(4) A user logs into another user’s machine and searches for
interesting files, emailing to their home email. This behavior
occurs more and more frequently over a 3 month period.
(5) A member of a group decimated by layoffs uploads docu-
ments to Dropbox, planning to use them for personal gain.
2.2 Anomaly detection at event level
We address the CERT insider threat use case through an anomaly
detection perspective, i.e. we aim at modeling normal user behavior
to detect deviations from this norm. Such anomalies are then con-
sidered as insider threat alarms. While this perspective has been
widely adopted for intrusion detection, unlike existing systems our
approach is to perform detection at fine-grained event level. In the
CERT insider threat use case, one event (i.e. log line) represents an
elementary user action and usually contains features to describe its
context. For instance, an event can represent a logon to a particular
computer and features can be the event time or the device used.
Our goal is to assign an anomaly score to each audit event.
The primary reason to perform detection at fine-grained event
level is to enhance alert traceability. Intrusion detection systems
are typically not used as standalone solution, but rather perform a
first selection of suspicious activities to be further scrutinized by
security analysts. In this context, flagging anomalies at fine-grained
event level eases traceability, as analysts will be able to determine
exactly which user action lead to an alert. On the contrary, using a
system like [36], an anomaly score is assigned to a whole day of
user activity, thus when an alarm is raised the question of which
exact elements triggered it remains open. A second advantage is
that data aggregation and feature engineering efforts are greatly
reduced compared to systems like [3, 12, 36]. As we will show next,
except for time features (which we transform only to reflect their
periodical nature), our methods use audit event attributes without
further preprocessing.
3 METHODS
3.1 Seq2one baseline
To detect insider threats at event level, we adapt DeepLog [8], a log
line anomaly detector for system traces. As we take into account
only one audit data source at a time, we only keep DeepLog’s event
features prediction module. It computes an anomaly score based on
the error between predicted and observed value for the next event.
We adapt the error function to support numeric and categorical
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Figure 1: Joint training architecture for the recurrent (RNN)
and feed-forward neural network (FFNN) used in ADSAGE.
This example shows the anomaly score prediction for event
e4 given previous events e1...e3. Note that ADSAGE compo-
nents are delimited by the blue area, while the seq2one base-
line corresponds to the orange area. Seq2one is trained on
normal events only, predicts the entire next event e˜4 and
compares it to the real e4 to derive an anomaly score. AD-
SAGE is trained on both normal and anomalous events being
generated with negative sampling (e.g. e ′4).
attributes. For numeric features, mean squared error is used and for
categorical attributes the error is 1 −p where p is the probability of
the true category, obtained by applying the softmax function. Each
error is then normalized by using its quantile (e.g. 0.99 if the error
is greater than 99% of observed errors for this feature). Quantiles
are finally averaged to obtain an event anomaly score. This method
is referred to as "seq2one" and corresponds to the orange area in
figure 1.
Unfortunately, our previous experiments on the CERT datasets
have shown that seq2one gives poor threat recall. One plausible ex-
planation is that user behavior in far less predictable than machine
behavior, hence predicting the next event is much more difficult
with user activity traces than with system logs used in [8]. This mo-
tivates us to extend DeepLog to better learn the distinction between
normal and anomalous behavior by introducing ADSAGE.
3.2 ADSAGE: Anomaly Detection in Sequences
of Attributed Graph Edges
As predicting the exact features of the next event is difficult for
user generated events, we propose ADSAGE, a method focusing on
predicting the validity of graph edges. In the following, we detail
how events can be represented as attributed graph edges (section
3.2.1) and how ADSAGE is trained to predict the validity of such
events (section 3.2.2), by relying on negative sampling (section
3.2.3).
3.2.1 Representing events as attributed graph edges. In ADSAGE
events are represented as attributed graph edges. Figure 2 shows an
example on authentication events similar to logs from CERT. An au-
thentication event is an interaction between a user and a computer,
corresponding to an edge in the graph of users and computers. In
ADSAGE, this edge is represented as the concatenation of its source
(user) and destination (computer) entities. As ADSAGE is based on
neural network models, an embedding layer is used for each entity
feature. Thus source and destination embeddings are optimized
according to the prediction task (described in section 3.2.2).
In addition to its source and destination entity, an edge can also
have features extracted from its event context (e.g. time features
and logon/logoff attributes in figure 2). Different types of features
are possible: numeric values, categorical attributes (as one-hot or
embedding representation) or even text content (via pre-trained
word embeddings).
Note that ADSAGE can be easily extended to the case where an
event has multiple sources and/or destinations. Events with a fixed
and limited number of sources or destinations can be represented
as concatenation of corresponding embeddings. For events with a
high and/or varying number of sources or destinations, it is possible
to use an embedding bag layer [30] (i.e. an embedding layer with
pooling function such as average or max) to obtain a fixed-length
representation.
3.2.2 Training FFNN and RNN jointly to learn edge validity. To
perform anomaly detection in sequences of attributed edges, we
use a combination of sequence-to-one RNN (similarly to seq2one)
and feedforward neural network (FFNN), both trained jointly. Given
a sequence of events for a given user, the RNN is trained to predict
the next event and outputs an RNN state representing the event
history up to this instant. The RNN uses a mixture of mean squared
error (for numeric features), cross-entropy (for one-hot encoded
features) and cosine loss (for embeddings).
The RNN state encoding history of previous events is used as
input for the FFNN, together with the next event. The FFNN is
trained to predict whether the edge representing the next event
is valid, which is formulated as a binary classification task using
cross-entropy loss.
Figure 1 shows the full architecture with RNN and FFNN, and
algorithm 1 details how both are trained simultaneously. Both our
seq2one baseline and ADSAGE maintain a separate RNN state for
each user. With this mechanism each user event sequence can be
modeled individually while the model is trained on all users. Note
that ADSAGE is trained on both normal and anomalous events
(generated by negative sampling, see section 3.2.3) and outputs
anomaly scores directly while seq2one is trained on observed events
only and predicts entire events. As shown later in evaluation, these
differences allow ADSAGE to better detect anomalous events.
3.2.3 Generating anomalous edges through negative sampling. In
order to get negative examples for the event validity classification
task (i.e. anomalous edges), we artificially replace the destination
entity through negative sampling (see figure 2). In a negative event,
the destination entity should be anomalous in the sense that inter-
actions from the source entity are usually not observed. In practice
we randomly draw a destination entity (e.g. computer for logons)
from the set of destinations never accessed from the source entity
(e.g. user) during the training period, while other edge attributes
are left unchanged. We use a constant negative sampling rate of 0.5
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Figure 2: Representation of audit events as attributed graph edges in ADSAGE on the example of authentication events. An
authentication event corresponds to a user-computer edge and is represented as the concatenation of user and computer
embeddings. Edge attributes can be added as well (i.e. time features, flag indicating logon or logoff). The user history (RNN
state) representing previous activities of current user A is also appended. Here, the first authentication event is encoded to
be processed by ADSAGE’s FFNN. On the right, the upper row represents the normal event. The lower row represents an
anomalous version of the same event, obtained with negative sampling on the edge destination (indicated by the asterisk).
The accessed computer in the anomalous event (PC_32) is selected at random among all computers never used by user A.
Algorithm 1 Training ADSAGE
function train_ADSAGE (n_epochs, batches):
for ep in n_epochs do
reset_rnn_states() // set all user RNN states to zero
for ffnn_x, ffnn_y, rnn_x, rnn_y in batches do
// ffnn_x: next events including negative samples
// ffnn_y: event validity labels
// rnn_x: sequences of true (positive) events
// rnn_y_true: next true event for each sequence in rnn_x
// FFNN step
// retrieve current RNN states for FFNN inputs
ffnn_states = get_user_rnn_states(ffnn_x)
// concat input events and user histories
ffnn_input = {ffnn_x, ffnn_states}
// predict validity of events (anomaly scores)
ffnn_y_pred = FFNN(ffnn_input)
backprop(ffnn_y_pred, ffnn_y)
// RNN step
// retrieve current RNN states for RNN inputs
rnn_states = get_user_rnn_states(rnn_x)
// predict the next event for each sequence
rnn_y_pred, rnn_states = RNN(rnn_x, rnn_states)
backprop(rnn_y_pred, rnn_y)
save_user_rnn_states(rnn_states)
end for
end for
(i.e. for one positive event, we generate a corresponding negative
event), however this value could be tuned as desired.
4 EVALUATION
We first present our general evaluation methodology in section
4.1, then we describe results obtained on the CERT insider threat
dataset in section 4.2 and on authentication events from the LANL
cybersecurity dataset in section 4.3.
4.1 Evaluation setting
4.1.1 Recall-based metrics. For our evaluation, we use recall-based
metrics introduced in [36]: recall curves and cumulative recall at
budget k (CRk ). These metrics are realistic from the perspective of
an organization with a fixed budget to investigate alerts generated
by an insider threat detection system. The organization’s daily
budget k represents the number of (most suspicious) users to be
investigated each day. If a malicious user is investigated on a given
day, all his malicious activities conducted that day are considered
as detected. Recall (at budget k) Rk is computed as the recall of
malicious users per day, averaged over all test days (days with no
malicious activity are ignored).
Note that although ADSAGE detects threats at event level, recall
at budget is computed at user-day level, i.e. in terms of number of
anomalous users detected for a given day. The first reason to do
so is to allow a comparison with [36]. The second is that when a
user is investigated following an alert, the investigator will have to
review the entire user activity (at least the whole user-day) to have
sufficient context to come to a decision.
Rk reflects detection performance at a fixed daily investigation
budget. To assess performance across multiple budgets, Rk can be
plotted against k up to a maximum budget kmax to obtain a recall
curve. Such curve can be summarized with normalized cumulative
recall computed as CRk =
∑i=k
i=0 Ri /n, where n is the number of
budget steps. CRk can be seen as an approximation of the area
under recall curve up to budget k .
4.1.2 Baselines. In each evaluation setting, we benchmark AD-
SAGE against 3 different types of baselines. The first is "seq2one"
which uses an RNN model to predict the features of next event
given previous events (see section 3.1).
Simple rule-based classifiers constitute the second type of base-
lines. These models are not expected to be competitive for insider
threat detection in practice, but they should be outperformed by
ADSAGE to ensure that detected anomalies are not trivial. For exam-
ple, if each user is assigned a computer, a simple rule is to consider
all authentication attempts to a different computer as anomalous.
Similar rules can be used for other types of events, the general
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pattern being that an edge from a source to a destination entity is
flagged as anomalous if it was not observed in the train set, and as
normal otherwise.
The last baseline we use is SedanSpot [10], a general anomaly
detectionmethod applicable to sequences of graph edges. SedanSpot
takes into account the timestamp of each edge, but does not support
additional edge attributes. Note that SedanSpot and rule-based
methods are deterministic and do not depend on initialization. This
is why we report exact performance metrics for these methods,
unlike for ADSAGE and seq2one.
4.1.3 Tuning ADSAGE hyperparameters. For each dataset we op-
timize ADSAGE’s hyperparameters. Most of them are related to
the underlying neural networks (RNN and FFNN). We tune fol-
lowing hyperparameters: number of timesteps, hidden units and
layers in the RNN, batch size, dimension of embeddings used to
represent graph features, learning rate and use different types of
pre-trained word embeddings (for datasets containing text features).
To speed up training on large datasets, we reduce training set size
by sampling users randomly. The user sample rate is another hy-
perparameter to tune, and one can also choose to sample only
from users presenting no malicious behavior. Testing is always
performed on all users. We tune one hyperparameter at a time to
determine its optimal value, then combine all best parameter values
as final configuration. Although this process does not take into
account dependencies between hyperparameters, it is much faster
than extensive grid search. For each evaluation setting we report
the optimal configuration found.
4.2 Insider threat detection in CERT dataset
Using the CERT dataset version 6.2, we perform the same train/test
data split as [36] to compare our results to theirs. We report cu-
mulative recall (CR, see section 4.1.1) at budgets 400 and 1000 and
at maximum budget 4000 for completeness. We also report recall
metrics based on detecting all threats present in the test set, i.e. ma-
licious activity across all event types, including log data sources not
seen by the detector. This is possible with daily budget-based recall
metrics, by assuming that investigators review all user activity that
day, even if the alert was generated by a single type of event. For
example, an anomaly alert triggered by an unusual logon event
might lead to an investigation which will uncover malicious email
activity from the same user on the same day. This setting leads to
metrics aligned with [36]. However keep in mind that the perfor-
mance comparison is unfair since ADSAGE and other baselines see
a single log data source.
ADSAGE and seq2one allow a flexible selection of features. How-
ever as our goal is to reduce feature engineering and preprocessing,
we consistently use following approach for all events from CERT.
First, we extract two time features from the date/time of each event:
the minute of day and day of week. We represent both through their
cosine and sine values in order to model their periodical nature. Sec-
ond, we use all other (i.e. non time) available event attributes as is
(with one hot encoding for categorical values). In each experiment,
we list these additional features for completeness.
We also detail results for individual threat scenarios (section
4.2.4). This helps understanding which types of malicious behaviors
are well detected by each method, and whether "blind spots" remain.
Certain scenarios are virtually impossible to detect using some log
data sources. For example, scenario 2 does not involve any logon
activity, meaning that logon event detectors only cannot possibly
alert about threats of this type.
For these reasons, methods presented in the following experi-
ments should not be viewed as standalone, "one-fits-all" detectors.
They rather are complementary, and each one addresses the CERT
insider threat detection problem from a different perspective, de-
pending on its data source. Though we compare our results to those
of [36] (who performs detection at user-day level and uses all data
sources), our focus is on understanding which event types are rel-
evant (in general and for each scenario) and finding out whether
insider threat detection is feasible at fine-grained event level.
4.2.1 Detecting threats in logon events. In a first experiment, we
apply ADSAGE and other baselines to detect insider threats in
logon events from the CERT dataset. In addition to edge sources
and destinations and time features, we include a binary attribute
indicating whether the action performed was a login or a logoff.
We use two simple rule-based baseline detectors. "Own PC" flags
all logon events occurring on user’s own machine (defined as the
most used computer for this user) as normal; all other events are
considered anomalous. "Known PC" considers a logon event to be
normal if the corresponding user-computer edge was observed in
the training set; otherwise it will be flagged as anomalous. Both
methods provide binary decisions.
We use following hyperparameters for seq2one and ADSAGE’s
RNN: 1 layer of 30 LSTM units, 15 timesteps, batch size = 100,
learning rate = 0.001 with decay factor of 0.5 after 1 epoch without
improvement and the dimensionality of computer embeddings is
set to 20. For ADSAGE’s FFNN we use 3 layers of respectively 50, 30
and 10 units with relu activation and dropout set to 0.2. We perform
5 runs with 10 epochs.
Detection results are shown in table 1. When it comes to detect-
ing threats present in logon events only, ADSAGE outperforms all
other methods, with cumulative recall at maximum budget of 0.981.
Cumulative recalls at lower budgets show a similar picture, and
full recall curves presented in figure 3 confirm that ADSAGE per-
forms best at almost any budget. However, for the task of detecting
all threats (i.e. including the ones not present in logon activity),
ADSAGE is outperformed by the system of [36].
4.2.2 Detecting threats in email events. In a second experiment, we
use email events as log data source. Email events from the CERT
dataset represent an email being sent or received/read. Considering
the significant overlap between the two, we only use "send" events.
In addition to time features, we use following attributes from
email events: email size (numeric), sender and receiver fields repre-
sented as embeddings ("from", "to", "cc", "bcc") and email content
(text). Representing the sender is straightforward as it contains only
one email address, so we use a simple embedding layer. However,
receiver fields can contain several entities, so we combine them
with an embedding bag layer [30] to obtain a fixed length repre-
sentation. All three receiver fields are encoded as separate features;
senders and receivers are embedded into a unique vector space.
Text content of emails is represented through pre-trained word
vectors, combined with a pooling scheme [37]. We have empirically
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Table 1: Detection results on logon events. For seq2one and
ADSAGE we report 95% confidence intervals over 10 runs.
Top table: detecting threats present in logon events only, bot-
tom table: detecting all threats (including those not present
in logon events).
Logon threats CR-400 CR-1000 CR-4000
own pc 0.633 0.853 0.963
known pc 0.617 0.847 0.962
SedanSpot 0.219 0.513 0.874
seq2one 0.039 ± 0.061 0.171 ± 0.151 0.679 ± 0.084
ADSAGE 0.813 ± 0.172 0.925 ± 0.069 0.981 ± 0.017
All threats CR-400 CR-1000 CR-4000
own pc 0.268 0.420 0.772
known pc 0.280 0.426 0.772
SedanSpot 0.119 0.338 0.814
seq2one 0.047 ± 0.088 0.155 ± 0.073 0.679 ± 0.084
[36] 0.731 0.893 not reported
ADSAGE 0.432 ± 0.037 0.605 ± 0.102 0.842 ± 0.104
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Recall curves
adsage CR-4000 = 0.981 ± 0.017 
seq2one CR-4000 = 0.679 ± 0.084
own pc baseline CR-4000 = 0.963 ± nan 
known pc baseline CR-4000 = 0.962 ± nan 
sedanspot CR-4000 = 0.874 ± nan
Figure 3: Recall curves with 95% confidence intervals over 5
runs for detecting threats present in logon events.
determined that GloVe [29] vectors with average pooling work best
for our problem.
We use two rule-based baselines for anomaly detection in email
events. In the first, called "known receivers", each email event is as-
signed a score representing the proportion of unobserved receivers,
i.e. receivers that were never contacted by the sender during the
training period. The second is referred to as "known receiver set".
It assigns a binary score depending on whether the exact set of
receivers was observed in the training set for the corresponding
sender (normal) or not (anomalous).
We use following hyperparameters for seq2one and ADSAGE’s
RNN: 1 layer of 100 LSTM units, 20 timesteps, batch size 1024, 5
epochs, learning rate of 0.01 with 0.5 decay factor after 1 epoch
without improvement. Embeddings of email senders and receivers
Table 2: Detection results on email events. For seq2one and
ADSAGEwe report 95% confidence intervals over 5 runs. Top
table: scores when detecting threats present in email events
only, bottom table: scores when detecting all threats (includ-
ing those not present in email events).
Email threats CR-400 CR-1000 CR-4000
known receivers 0.106 0.340 0.782
known receiver set 0.138 0.278 0.725
SedanSpot 0.044 0.098 0.628
seq2one 0.217 ± 0.124 0.431 ± 0.109 0.830 ± 0.035
ADSAGE 0.332 ± 0.226 0.646 ± 0.117 0.907 ± 0.026
All threats CR-400 CR-1000 CR-4000
known receivers 0.116 0.408 0.827
known receiver set 0.134 0.318 0.754
SedanSpot 0.280 0.415 0.784
seq2one 0.199 ± 0.093 0.426 ± 0.100 0.822 ± 0.036
[36] 0.731 0.893 not reported
ADSAGE 0.447 ± 0.118 0.728 ± 0.67 0.930 ± 0.017
are of dimension 20. For ADSAGE’s FFNN we use 3 layers of respec-
tively 50, 30 and 10 units with relu activation and dropout = 0.2.
We perform 5 runs of with 5 epochs and use the same data split as
for logon events, but we train only on a random sample of all users
(10%). This speeds up the training process without significantly
altering performance.
Detection results are shown in table 2. For threats present in
email events, ADSAGE outperforms other methods and reaches a
cumulative recall at maximum budget CR-4000 = 0.907. As shown
in figure 4, a budget of around 800 allows to detect 90% of threats
in email events. Applying ADSAGE to email events also allows to
detect threats present in all events effectively (CR-4000 = 0.930),
even though the system of [36] still performs best. Nevertheless it
suggests that email events are a good marker for insider threats.
4.2.3 Detecting threats in web events. In a third experiment on
the CERT dataset, we use web events as data source. Web events
represent user browsing activities. In addition to edge sources and
destinations and time features, we tried adding the content of web
page as text feature but ended up discarding it because it did not
improve detection performance significantly.
We use a rule-based baseline for anomaly detection which we
call "known domain". It assigns binary anomaly scores based on
whether the web domain of an event has been observed in the
training period for the corresponding user. Thus all accesses to new,
unobserved domains are considered anomalous; the rest is deemed
normal.
We use following hyperparameters for seq2one and ADSAGE’s
RNN: 1 layer of 100 LSTM units, 20 timesteps, batch size 2048,
5 epochs and learning rate of 0.001 with 0.5 decay factor after 1
epoch without improvement. Embeddings of email senders and
receivers are of dimension 50. For ADSAGE’s FFNN we use 3 layers
of respectively 50, 30 and 10 units with relu activation with dropout
= 0.2. As the volume of web events is much larger than other for
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Figure 4: Recall curves with 95% confidence intervals over 5
runs for detecting threats present in email events.
Table 3: Detection results on web events. For seq2one and
ADSAGEwe report 95% confidence intervals over 5 runs. Top
table: scores when detecting threats present in web events
only, bottom table: scores when detecting all threats (includ-
ing those not present in web events).
Web threats CR-400 CR-1000 CR-4000
known domain 0 0.150 0.598
SedanSpot 0.313 0.711 0.928
seq2one 0.175 ± 0.129 0.344 ± 0.054 0.745 ± 0.078
ADSAGE 0.054 ± 0.070 0.179 ± 0.127 0.696 ± 0.102
All threats CR-400 CR-1000 CR-4000
known domain 0.042 0.148 0.588
SedanSpot 0.199 0.432 0.736
seq2one 0.132 ± 0.078 0.259 ± 0.087 0.693 ± 0.061
[36] 0.731 0.893 not reported
ADSAGE 0.035 ± 0.030 0.109 ± 0.026 0.608 ± 0.031
other audit data sources, we train on a random sample of 5% of all
users, discarding malicious ones and perform 5 runs with 5 epochs.
Table 3 shows detection results. SedanSpot outperforms other
methods with CR-4000 = 0.928 when detecting threats present in
web events only. As shown on figure 5, a budget of around 600
is sufficient to detect all threats in web events. When considering
recall of all threats, SedanSpot gives the best results (followed by
seq2one, difference is not statistically significant), but is not as ef-
fective as the system from [36], which uses all data sources. Overall,
ADSAGE is not adapted to detect anomalies in web events repre-
sented as user to web domain edges. One possible explanation is
that the domain identifier is not informative enough to characterize
browsing behavior.
4.2.4 Results by threat scenarios. In order to characterize which
methods and data sources allow to detect each CERT insider threat
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Figure 5: Recall curves with 95% confidence intervals over 5
runs for detecting threats present in web events.
scenario (see section 2.1), we evaluate all logon, email and web
detectors using a different data split.We use the period from January
to July 2010 as train set and test on August 2010 to April 2011. This
allows us to assess detection performance on all threat scenarios,
whereas the test set used by [36] contains only scenarios 2 and 4.
Hyperparameter values determined earlier are kept unchanged.
Detection results (CR-4000 scores) for each scenario presented
by detector and data source are shown in table 4. It appears that
monitoring logon events can be effective (CR-4000 ≥ 0.85) to detect
scenarios 3, 4 and 5. Rule-based methods ("own PC", "known PC")
give good performance for these scenarios, however ADSAGE and
SedanSpot can be better for 3 and 5 respectively. Email traffic is a
good audit data source to detect scenarios 2, 4 and 5. ADSAGE ranks
among the best detectors for scenarios 2 to 5, while SedanSpot is
particularly effective for scenario 2 and the "known receivers" base-
line proves strong against scenarios 4 and 5. Finally, web browsing
logs can be used to uncover scenarios 2 (using SedanSpot or "known
domain"), 4 and 5 (with "known domain").
These results suggest that anomalies flagged by distinct detectors
overlap only partially, thus methods can be complementary in
detecting insider threats. By combining anomaly scores obtained
from several perspectives (i.e. computed by distinct methods using
different audit data sources), we can expect detection performance
improvement. Possible approaches to perform fine-grained anomaly
score fusion are mentioned in section 6.2. We insist on the fact that
this approach differs from data aggregation: as anomaly scores are
attributed at fine-grained level, the root cause of alerts can still be
determined precisely.
4.3 Detecting anomalies in real authentications
To complement our results on the synthetic CERT datasets, we
evaluate our methods on real-world authentication logs from the
LANL’s multi-source cybersecurity events [17, 18]. This dataset
contains Windows authentications, process traces, DNS data and
network flows of from more than 12000 users collected over 58
7
Table 4: Detection performance (cumulative recall at maximum budget, CR-4000) for different insider threat scenarios.
Threat scenario
Data source Detection method 1 2 3 4 5
Logon
(10 runs)
own pc baseline 0.392 0.636 0.848 0.966 0.963
known pc baseline 0.598 0.646 0.855 0.963 0.963
SedanSpot 0.117 0.642 0.364 0.875 0.969
seq2one 0.618 ± 0.099 0.614 ± 0.019 0.695 ± 0.017 0.690 ± 0.046 0.515 ± 0.185
ADSAGE 0.645 ± 0.109 0.667 ± 0.086 0.825 ± 0.012 0.975 ± 0.007 0.495 ± 0.135
Email
(5 runs)
known receivers baseline 0.652 0.810 0.600 0.885 0.900
known receiver set baseline 0.617 0.714 0.646 0.783 0.894
SedanSpot 0.823 0.928 0.664 0.548 0.763
seq2one 0.762 ± 0.124 0.770 ± 0.036 0.669 ± 0.054 0.815 ± 0.032 0.730 ± 0.210
ADSAGE 0.668 ± 0.120 0.853 ± 0.132 0.669 ± 0.043 0.798 ± 0.138 0.942 ± 0.071
Web
(5 runs)
known domain baseline 0.731 0.853 0.717 0.837 1.000
SedanSpot 0.294 0.944 0.554 0.433 0.906
seq2one 0.743 ± 0.089 0.720 ± 0.021 0.619 ± 0.029 0.638 ± 0.039 0.680 ± 0.257
ADSAGE 0.468 ± 0.075 0.704 ± 0.112 0.727 ± 0.029 0.446 ± 0.056 0.631 ± 0.287
days. However we only use authentication events, as they contain
ground truth anomalies (malicious examples injected by a red team)
unlike other traces.
We preprocess the dataset as follows. First, we remove authenti-
cations from special aliases and system accounts. Second, we align
attributes of normal and red team events by keeping only the times-
tamp, user, source and destination computer attributes. For normal
authentications events we use the "source" user attribute, ignoring
the "destination" user. This is justified because the values of these
two fields are the same most of the time, except if source user A
authenticates as destination user B. In this case, A will be seen
as B after such authentication. Finally, we merge normal and red
team events to obtain a dataset containing almost 12000 users. Our
maximal budget for cumulative recall metrics is therefore set at
12000. We use days 1 to 8 as train set (44.2M events, 50 anomalies)
and days 9 to 13 (27.7M events, 587 anomalies) as test set.
For ADSAGE and seq2one, we use the same time features as for
CERT data. Graph features are the source and destination computer
of an authentication event, meaning that we have two attributed
user to computer edges. For this reason, we implement two rule-
based baselines "known source PC" and "known destination PC",
which are equivalent to "known PC" for logon events (see section
4.2.1) for each corresponding graph feature. We also run two in-
stances of SedanSpot, one for edges from user to source computer
and the other for user to destination computer.
We use following hyperparameters for seq2one and ADSAGE’s
RNN: 1 layer of 50 LSTM units, 10 timesteps, batch size 512, 15
epochs, learning rate of 0.001 with 0.5 decay factor after 1 epoch
without improvement and no dropout. Embeddings of source and
destination computers have a dimensionality of 20. For ADSAGE’s
FFNN we use 3 layers of respectively 50, 30 and 10 units with relu
activation with dropout = 0.2. We train on a 10% random sample of
all users.
Table 5: Detection results for red team anomalies in LANL
authentication events. We report normalized cumulative re-
calls at budgets 1000, 4000 and 12000 for 5.2. For seq2one and
ADSAGE we report 95% confidence intervals over 5 runs.
Detecting red team events
in LANL authentications CR-1000 CR-4000 CR-12000
known dest pc 0.237 0.566 0.829
known source pc 0.254 0.669 0.890
SedanSpot (dest) pc 0.016 0.104 0.490
SedanSpot (source) pc 0.089 0.191 0.538
seq2one 0.167± 0.023
0.423
± 0.031
0.752
± 0.014
ADSAGE 0.255± 0.078
0.653
± 0.042
0.877
± 0.014
Cumulative recall values at budgets 1000, 4000 and 12000 are
presented in table 5. ADSAGE and the "known source pc" rule-
based classifier outperform all other methods at all 3 budget values.
At maximum budget, their cumulative recall reaches 0.88 and 0.89
respectively (though the difference is not statistically significant).
Detection results from SedanSpot and our rule-based classifier also
suggest that the source computer attribute in LANL authentication
events is more informative than the destination computer. ADSAGE
has the advantage to support both attributes simultaneously. Note
that how results obtained on LANL and CERT logon events are con-
sistent, which is reassuring given that unlike LANL authentications,
the CERT datasets are synthetic.
5 RELATEDWORK
5.1 CERT insider threat use case
Despite a large body of work addressing the CERT use case, com-
paring detection performance of existing insider threat detection
systems remains challenging, due to different metrics and choices
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of train/test data split. In most cases, ROC AUC score (as indicator
of detection performance across all decision thresholds) or detec-
tion and false positive rate (for a single decision threshold) is used.
Highest ROC AUC is reported by [14] (0.99) however they use a
very limited data subset and rely on information unavailable in
practice (Does user quit at later time?), so whether this level of
performance could be attained on the whole dataset remains an
open question. Yuan et al. [41] report a ROC AUC of 0.95 using
features designed with expert knowledge about threats (see table 1
in their paper). When considering detection and false positive rate,
the best score is reported by [20], achieving 86% detected threats
with 20% false positives (and 0.86 ROC AUC). However because
of the very high class imbalance, the false positive rate is much
too high in practice (e.g. 1 million samples would generate 200,000
false alarms). To circumvent the absence of standard benchmark,
we adopt the evaluation setting of Tuor et al. [36], which relies on
business-realistic recall metrics (see section 4.1.1 for more details).
5.2 Graph and text for insider threat detection
Graph features have proven useful in insider threat detection, for
example to represent email activity [9, 27], collaboration through
access logs [6] or workgroup roles [25]. Graph analysis can be
used to address concept drift [28] and community detection [33].
Additionally, provenance and knowledge graphs can prevent insider
threats from a physical security perspective [2, 23, 26]. Text features
can help characterizing user sentiment [5, 16, 24].
Surprisingly, in the CERT datasets [13, 35] graph (user to com-
puter relations, web pages, email communication, LDAP attributes)
and text features (content of web pages, emails and files) have
been largely ignored, except for computer relations in logon events.
To the best of our knowledge, the only system making use of the
web page graph is [11], which clusters users and web pages to
find similarities in browsing behavior. Unfortunately, no detection
performance is reported. For email traffic, existing systems use ad-
dresses to determine if receivers are internal or external [1, 19, 32],
but do not attempt to use the full email graph. Graph features from
the LDAP attributes are more often used [14, 19–22, 36]. Text con-
tent is only used in [12] as simple statistical features and in [21]
through bag-of-words and linguistic features.
5.3 Graph edge level anomaly detection
Like ADSAGE, some methods perform anomaly detection at graph
edge level, but we are not aware of another method supporting
both sequences of edges and edge attributes. Existing works per-
form anomaly detection in edge streams, but do not support edge
attributes [10, 15, 31, 39, 40, 42] . On the contrary, EdgeCentric [34]
supports edge attributes, however it detects anomalies at node level.
Unfortunately not all methods were compared to each other. In the
end, we have chosen to use SedanSpot [10] as baseline for its good
performance and usable, well-documented implementation.
5.4 Anomaly detection at event level
Amain characteristic of our approach is to perform detection at fine-
grained event level to enhance alert traceability. If this perspective
is novel for insider threats, similar works can be found in system
log analysis. DeepLog [8] uses workflows of normal behavior to
diagnose which element is anomalous within log line sequences
while Wurzenberger et al. [38] use clustering for similar purposes.
Brown et al. [4] go further and provide character level anomaly
scores by using neural network attention mechanisms.
6 CONCLUSION
6.1 Main findings
ADSAGE fills a gap in anomaly detection at graph edge level, as
existing methods do not support sequences and attributed edges
simultaneously. Our method supports heterogeneous attributes: nu-
meric, categorical and text. Focusing on insider threat detection, we
have benchmarked ADSAGE against SedanSpot and other baselines
on different data sources from the CERT and LANL datasets (authen-
tication, email and web browsing logs). Our approach significantly
differs from concurrent systems in that detection is performed at
fine-grained event to enhance alert traceability. We have found that
ADSAGE is effective to detect anomalies in authentications (rep-
resented as user to computer edges) and in email traffic (sender to
receiver edges). For CERTweb browsing logs, represented as user to
web domain relations, ADSAGE is not appropriate but other meth-
ods such as SedanSpot or rule-based detectors can be used instead.
Crucially, we note that results obtained on authentication logs are
consistent across LANL (real) and CERT (synthetic) datasets, which
is reassuring concerning realism of the latter.
As our method uses only one audit data source at a time, report-
ing results split by threat scenarios has allowed us to gain insight
about which audit data sources and which methods are suited to
target specific malicious behaviors. Although we could not meet
state-of-the-art performance of [36] when detecting threats over all
audit source domains, a direct comparison is unfair as our method
relies on a unique audit data source. Still, we believe the perfor-
mance gap is encouraging given that preprocessing and feature
engineering effort are reduced, while alert traceability is improved.
Overall, our experimental results show that insider threat de-
tection at fine-grained event level is feasible. Beyond the choice
of detection method, we have found that graph (user to computer
relations, email communications) and text features (email contents)
from the CERT datasets can be informative to spot insider threats.
6.2 Possible extensions
Concerning ADSAGE specifically, we have chosen to generate one
negative sample for each positive one. We suggest to conduct fur-
ther experiments to assess the influence of negative sampling rate.
More generally, this work performs insider threat detection using
only one data source at a time. Detection results by threat scenarios
show that anomalies retrieved by different methods overlap only
partially, suggesting that detection improvement can be expected
from combining several detectors. In this regard, detailed perfor-
mance results split by threat scenario presented here could help
choosing complementary methods to be combined. One simplistic
possibility is to aggregate anomaly scores, for instance with averag-
ing at user-day level. A second, more sophisticated approach, could
be to run several synchronized instances of ADSAGE (one for each
audit data source) sharing their RNN states. This could help provide
context from other data sources while still performing fine-grained
anomaly detection.
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